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ScienceDirectCoronaviruses (CoVs) able to infect humans emerge through
cross-host transmission from animals. There is substantial
evidence that the recent Middle East respiratory syndrome
(MERS)-CoV outbreak is fueled by zoonotic transmission from
dromedary camels. This is largely based on the fact that closely
related viruses have been isolated from this but not any other
animal species. Given the widespread geographical distribution
of dromedaries found seropositive for MERS-CoV, continued
transmission may likely occur in the future. Therefore, a further
understanding of the cross host transmission of MERS-CoV is
needed to limit the risks this virus poses to man.
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Introduction
Coronaviruses are positive strand RNA viruses that cause
disease in humans and animals. Through cross-host trans-
mission events these viruses may substantially broaden
their host range. Animal-to-human zoonotic transmissions
led to worldwide spread of viruses such as hCoV-OC43
and NL63, that mainly cause common cold like symp-
toms in humans. The recent zoonotic introduction of two
more pathogenic viruses, severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) CoV and Middle East respiratory syn-
drome (MERS)-CoV, on the other hand revealed the
damage these viruses can do to human society. Evidence
that SARS-CoV emerged through zoonotic transmission
came from genetic analyses of virus isolates from infected
humans and palm civets during the SARS epidemic [1].
The virus underwent rapid adaptation in both hosts,
primarily in the receptor binding domain of the viral
spike protein, to allow more efficient infection of humanwww.sciencedirect.com cells. Subsequent surveillance studies identified at least
60 novel bat coronaviruses worldwide, including ancestors
of SARS-CoV. Now there is substantial evidence that
Chinese horseshoe bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-
CoV like viruses [2,3]. These viruses were isolated from
bat fecal samples and they use the same host viral
receptor, angiotensin converting enzyme 2 (ACE2), from
humans, civets and Chinese horseshoe bats to enter cells
[4]. Recent studies further document the capacity of
this virus to jump the species barrier [5]. Currently,
twelve years after the outbreak several potential scenarios
are revealed that might explain the emergence of SARS-
CoV. Although adaptation of the virus that led to a
pathogenic variant may have primarily taken place in
the civet cat, it may also have occurred first in humans
and spread subsequently to civet cats. Alternatively,
recombination events between viruses present in bats
may occur relatively frequently, leading to variants in bats
that are already pathogenic for humans [5]. In this review
we summarize the current evidence found so far for cross
host transmission of MERS-CoV, a virus that was identi-
fied three years ago.
MERS-CoV like viruses in bats
Shortly after the isolation and characterization of MERS-
CoV from a patient in Saudi Arabia in 2012, it was realized
that also in this case bats could potentially serve as a host
for this virus. Different from SARS, only few isolated
cases were seen early on in 2012, suggesting a spillover
directly from an animal reservoir, potentially bats. Phy-
logenetic analysis of the replicase gene of coronaviruses
indeed showed that MERS-CoV is most closely related to
Tylonycteris bat coronavirus HKU4 and Pipistrellus bat
coronavirus HKU5, which prototype two species in line-
age C of the genus Betacoronavirus [6]. In addition,
MERS-CoV could be grown in bat cells [7]. This is highly
remarkable, as most other prototype CoVs, including
human, bovine, feline, or porcine CoVs, are normally
unable to do so. Follow up studies revealed that
MERS-CoV uses a phylogenetically conserved cell sur-
face amino peptidase, dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4), also
known as CD26, as a functional receptor [8]. This
multifunctional protein plays a major role in glucose me-
tabolism by its degradation of incretins and is also impli-
cated in T-cell activation, chemotaxis modulation, cell
adhesion, and apoptosis. Consistent with the capacity of
MERS-CoV to replicate in bat cells, expression of human
and bat (Pipistrellus pipistrellus) DPP4 in non-susceptibleCurrent Opinion in Virology 2016, 16:55–62
56 Emerging viruses: interspecies transmissionhuman COS-7 cells enabled infection by MERS-CoV [8].
Other bat CoVs also appear to utilize this receptor to enter
cells. The spike protein of CoV HKU4 binds to DPP4,
however, it does not mediate viral entry into human cells
because of the inability to become activated by human
endogenous proteases [9,10]. In fact, two residue differ-
ences between the two spikes account for their different
capabilities to mediate viral entry into human cells [11],
revealing a potential adaptation of MERS-CoV to become
more pathogenic in humans. Although these studies pro-
vide clues about the origin MERS-CoV, to date no close
relative has been identified in bats that is capable of using
DPP4. Studies in Saudi Arabia to investigate the presence
of MERS-CoV in bats were unable to recover additional
sequences beyond a 190-nt fragment from the conserved
polymerase gene in a single specimen [12]. The subse-
quent characterization of an African bat virus closely relat-
ed to MERS-CoV showed that this bat virus roots the
phylogenetic tree of MERS-CoV [13,14]. However, spike
gene sequences obtained from bat CoVs characterized thus
far are still phylogenetically distantly related to MERS-
CoV. Theoretically the initial host switch from bats may
have taken place in Africa. In the absence of hard evidence
that bats act as the reservoir of current MERS-CoV zoo-
notic transmissions, subsequent studies focused on other
animal species. Phylogenetic analysis of DPP4 indicated
that human, macaque, horse, and rabbit DPP4 cluster
together with bovine and porcine DPP4, which are some-
what more distantly related (Figure 1). Small animals,
including ferret and mice, are more divergent with respect
to the DPP4 virus binding region [15], which has conse-
quences for MERS-CoV binding and capacity to infect
cells [16]. In fact the presence of a glycosylation site in the
virus binding domain of DPP4 prohibits MERS-CoV in-
fection of these small animal species [17]. On the other
hand several studies demonstrated the potential of MERS-
CoV to infect cells of different species in vitro [16,18].
Further experimental evidence is needed to prove their in
vivo susceptibility to MERS-CoV. Besides receptor func-
tionality, the distribution of the DPP4, presence of
enzymes able to cleave the spike protein and cause fusion
are potentially critical in the host range of MERS-CoV.
Innate and specific host responses may negatively affect
the outcome of the infection resulting in the inability of the
virus to spread efficiently.
Dromedaries as source for zoonotic
transmission
Some of the earliest observations suggested contact of
MERS patients with livestock, including dromedary
camels and goats [19–22]. Data provided by the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) for the period 2012–2014 show that cows, drome-
dary camels, goats and sheep are the main sources of meat
and milk in the MERS-CoV affected countries [23].
Through numerous serologic studies in these animals
in the Arabian Peninsula it became clear that the geneticCurrent Opinion in Virology 2016, 16:55–62 diversity in MERS-CoV in people could only be
explained by multiple independent, geographically struc-
tured, zoonotic events [20,24]. Sheep, goats, cattle, drom-
edary camels, horses and poultry have been analyzed for
the presence of MERS-CoV specific antibodies [25–30]
but serologic evidence for MERS-CoV infection has only
been found in dromedaries.
In August 2013, dromedaries were implicated for the first
time as possible source for human infection based on the
presence of MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies in drome-
daries from Spain (Canary Islands) and Oman [31]. Since
then, MERS-CoV specific antibodies have been detected
in camels across the Middle East and the African continent
and in sera taken up to 30 years ago, suggesting a geo-
graphically widespread and longstanding enzootic circula-
tion in camels. Levels of seropositivity observed in adult
dromedaries in Asia and Africa was generally >80% with
exception of the Canary islands and Tunisia were seropos-
itivity rates of 14% and 54% respectively were reported
[25,27–30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41]. A re-
cent study suggested that seropositivity at the Canary
Islands is solely due to exposure of camels >20 years
ago in Africa [42], however a different study described
the presence of MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies in a 2-
year old camel that was born on the Canary Islands [31].
Subsequently, MERS-CoV genomes were detected in
nasal swabs of dromedaries in ARE, Egypt, Iran,
Israel, KSA, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan and Qatar
[29,32,38,39,40,41,43–48,49,50], and the virus was
isolated from dromedaries in ARE, Egypt, KSA and Qatar
[38,40,51,52]. Phylogenetic analysis of MERS-CoV gen-
omes shows that viruses isolated from humans and drom-
edary camels are highly similar (Figure 2). Besides nasal
swabs, MERS-CoV RNA has been found in oral, bron-
chial and anal swabs, milk and feces as well as in lymph
nodes, turbinate, olfactory epithelium, larynx, pharynx,
trachea and lung lobs [46,50,53,54]. Sampling of the
nasal cavity seems to be the best option for sampling live
camels [46]. In one study in which lung tissue with lesions
was sampled in a slaughterhouse in KSA, MERS-CoV
RNA was detected in 61.5% of the samples [50]. The
percentage positive nasal swabs varied from 1.6% to 59%
in various studies but direct comparison of shedding rates
is difficult as they will be dependent on the number of
animals sampled, their age distribution, sampling season,
origin of the camels and connectivity with other camels
from different origins. However the majority of studies
show that calves (2 year) with primary infections will
most likely play a bigger role in MERS-CoV epidemiolo-
gy than older animals for which less frequent shedding is
observed and who demonstrated higher rates of serocon-
version [26,29,34,38,40,50]. A higher rate of virus isola-
tion was observed for calves than subadults (2–4 years of
age) implying an increased infectivity of animals <2 years
[40]. Infectious virus seems to be excreted for only awww.sciencedirect.com
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Phylogenetic tree based on a DPP4 fragment containing the S1 binding region (residues 246–504 of 16 different species). Sequence alignment
was performed by using ClustalW in the MEGA5.0 software package (www.megasoftware.net), and the trees were constructed by using the
neighbor-joining method with P distances (gap/missing data treatment; complete deletion) and 1000 bootstrap replicates as in MEGA version
5.0. Known MERS-CoV susceptible species (green), non-susceptible species (red) and unknown (black).limited period of time (up to 7 days) in the field and under
experimental conditions while in the latter situation ex-
cretion of viral RNA could be detected for up to 35 days
[40,53]. Mild disease of the upper respiratory tract or no
overt disease has been observed in young and adult camels
naturally infected with MERS-CoV [38,39,48,49,50].
Experimental infections indicated that MERS-CoV in
adult dromedaries gives a mild respiratory disease with
purulent nasal discharge [53]. A study in mother–calf pairs
in Dubai showed that MERS-CoV causes acute infectionswww.sciencedirect.com in dromedaries and it was concluded that persistent infec-
tion in adult animals is unlikely [40]. The detection of
MERS-CoV RNA in camels with pre-existing antibodies in
a herd in KSA and an observed lack of correlation between
viral RNA loads and levels of neutralizing antibodies in
camels for slaughter in Qatar might indicate limited im-
mune-protection and a potential for re-infection despite
previous exposure [38,46] Indeed, circulation up to 2–4
months of the same virus strains at the herd level has been
demonstrated [40,46].Current Opinion in Virology 2016, 16:55–62
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Phylogenetic analysis of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronaviruses (MERSCoVs). Complete genome sequences of human and camel MERS-
CoV isolates were aligned by using ClustalW, and a phylogenetic tree was constructed by using the PhyML method in Seaview 4 (all 3 software
packages can be found at http://pbil.univ-lyon1.fr/software/seaview) and was visualized in FigTree version 1.3.1 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/
figtree/). Values at branches show the result of the approximate likelihood ratio; values <0.70 are not shown. MERS-CoV isolates from dromedary
camels are shown in camel silhouette and the human MERS-CoV isolates are shown in human silhouette. Scale bar indicates nucleotide
substitutions per site.Camel-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV
Accumulating evidence shows that dromedary camels are
a reservoir for human infections. Analysis of an outbreak
associated with a barn in Qatar found both dromedariesCurrent Opinion in Virology 2016, 16:55–62 and humans to be infected with nearly identical strains of
MERS-CoV. Although this was the first temporal associ-
ation between camel and human infection, it could not be
concluded whether the people on the farm were infectedwww.sciencedirect.com
MERS coronavirus transmission Reusken et al. 59by the camels or vice versa, or if a third (wildlife) source
was responsible [32]. Further support for camels as a
reservoir came from a nation-wide study in KSA that
found widespread circulation of different genetic variants
of MERS- CoV in camels, with geographic clustering of
human and camel MERS-CoV sequences [29]. A case
study with concurrent dromedary and human infection on
a barn in KSA found evidence for one-directional camel-
to-human transmission; while the dromedaries showed
declining RNA viral loads and increasing antibody titers,
the owner was hospitalized with acute MERS [48,49,55].
A more recent study of risk factors for primary MERS-
CoV illness in humans indicated that direct exposure to
dromedary camels during the 2 weeks before disease
onset was associated with MERS-COV illness [56]. In
addition, several studies suggest that persons in regular
contact with camels have higher seropositivity rates than
persons not in contact with camels. An overall seropreva-
lence of 0.15% was observed in a cross-sectional study in
>10 000 persons in KSA while 3.6% of 140 slaughterhouse
workers were seropositive [57]. In a study in Qatar,
MERS-CoV antibodies were detected in healthy persons
with daily, occupational contact with dromedaries but not
in persons without such contact [58]. Four out of five
dedicated camel slaughterers were seropositive at a loca-
tion with massive exposure potential as 59% of the camels
for slaughter was positive for MERS-CoV RNA at two
time points [46,58]. Other studies did not yield serologic
evidence of infection in persons with occupational expo-
sure to dromedaries [49,59–61]. However, only one of
those studies documented actual MERS-CoV circulation
in dromedaries in one herd during contact with a small
group of 7 persons [59].
Transmission routes
Although camels are suspected to be the primary source of
infection for humans, the routes of direct or indirect
zoonotic transmission are yet unknown. The majority of
primary cases do not report contact with animals [62,63].
Dromedary camels are ubiquitously present in the Middle
East and have been part of desert cultures for centuries
with cultural and economic importance [62]. Camel milk
and meat, in particular meat from the hump, are commonly
consumed while some consider raw organ meet a delicacy
[62]. A study in a slaughterhouse in Qatar found MERS-
CoV RNA in lymph nodes of slaughtered camels which
might be indicative for the presence of the virus in camel
meat [46]. However, experimental infection of three
camels did not show any evidence for the presence of
infectious MERS-CoV in organs and meat [53]. Another
route for meat-borne transmission of MERS-CoV is possi-
bly through contamination of the meat during slaughter
with respiratory or fecal excreta. In a slaughterhouse in
Qatar, 59% of the camels was shedding viral RNA in nasal
excretions at the time of slaughter while viral RNA was
found in 15% of the fecal swabs [36]. Camel milk, with or
without addition of camel urine, is preferably consumedwww.sciencedirect.com raw as raw milk is believed to have a high nutritional and
medicinal value [63]. Raw milk as source of MERS-CoV
infection is supported by the observation of the presence of
MERS-CoV RNA in raw milk that was collected according
to local customs in Qatar. Camel udders are usually not
cleaned before milking and hygienic conditions are such
that udders and milk can be contaminated with nasal and/or
fecal secretions from the dam, saliva of the calves that are
used to initiated the letting of the milk, or hands of the
milker [54]. Analysis of camel milk inoculated with MERS-
CoV showed that MERS-CoV is stable in milk stored at
22 8C and 4 8C for respectively 48 and 72 h while pasteuri-
zation destroyed viral viability [64]. Consumption of raw
camel milk has been linked to several human MERS cases
in KSA and Qatar [49]. The current WHO advise to avoid
contracting MERS-CoV from dromedaries is based on the
above observations (people should avoid drinking raw camel
milk, camel urine and eating meat that is not thoroughly
cooked) but it is clear that the potential for zoonotic droplet
and/or aerosol transmission of MERS-CoV is highly
neglected both in research and prevention advise.
Conclusions
There is very strong evidence that dromedary camels are a
reservoir for human infections. Although camels are sus-
pected to be the primary source of infection for humans and
MERS-CoV genomes from humans and dromedary camels
have been shown to be highly similar, routes of direct or
indirect zoonotic transmission are yet unknown. There-
fore, detailed case control studies are needed to unravel the
exact routes of transmission. By doing so preventive mea-
sures can be taken to reduce the zoonotic transmission of
MERS-CoV. In addition, efforts to block or reduce virus
excretion from MERS-CoV infected dromedary by vacci-
nation in combination with the development of therapeu-
tics to treat MERS patients need to be further evaluated.
The use of the evolutionarily conserved DPP4 protein as a
viral receptor suggests that not only dromedary camels but
also other animal species may be potential targets of this
virus. Further experimental studies in different animal
species and serosurveillance studies in livestock animals
should continue to monitor the spread of MERS-CoV in
the Middle East but also in other areas such as Africa and
Asia.
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